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ABSTRACT
The main aim of this article is to assess the influence of change
in Prime Minister on Polish stock market. Prime Minister Szydło
resigned shortly after she survived the second vote of no confi-
dence on December 8, 2017, and was replaced by Morawiecki,
the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and a former
CEO of a large bank.1 Considering the aforementioned context,
this study tests four hypotheses regarding the market reaction in
terms of companies’ shareholder structure. An event study ana-
lysis was performed to calculate cumulative abnormal returns,
and regression models were estimated to test the hypotheses.
The author finds significant negative price changes only for state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) both directly and indirectly controlled
by the government. I assume that this reaction in the case of
SOEs was caused by the uncertainty related to the likely changes
in the management.
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There is an unquestionable strong link between a country’s politics and its economy.
Apart from fundamental issues such as changes in the dynamics of the gross domestic
product, inflation, or exchange rates, the impact of politics on the stock exchange is
also significant. Each political change causes risk and impacts the capital markets
(Kirikkaleli, 2020) with the market reaction often being negative (Mensi et al., 2016).
This study focuses on an unprecedented event that happened in Poland on Friday,
December 7, 2017, when the Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło won the vote of no
confidence in the government. However, she resigned on Saturday afternoon,
December 8, 2017. On Monday, December 11, 2017, Mateusz Morawiecki, the then
Deputy Prime Minister, was sworn in as the new Prime Minister.
This situation can be compared to the withdrawal of the United States (US)
Senator James Jeffords from the Republican Party. Jayachandran (2006) measured the
price response to the unexpected gain in control of the US Senate by the Democratic
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Party. Valuation of entities associated with the Party increased by 0.17%. The impact
of politics is also studied by Levy and Yagil (2015), who showed that each time the
polls indicated the assumption of power by a liberal president, the income rates on
the stock market increased.
In both the studies, the initial part was based on the traditional event study
methodology, as in the present study. Subsequently, the authors estimated regression
models for cumulative abnormal return rates (CARs) using several different variables.
A similar method is adopted in this study using variables that provide information
about the type of company, its financial characteristics, officers connection,
and ownership.
The results presented in the article indicate a reaction consistent with the hypoth-
esis of information efficiency. It shows that significant price changes occurred only in
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Such enterprises have the highest risk of exposure to
changes in company officers, which emerge as an outcome of the election and the
reshuffling of the cabinet. This study’s most important conclusion is the fact that the
strongest market reaction appeared for directly controlled SOEs.
Given this context, the main contribution of this study lies in its detailed analysis
of the market reaction to the unexpected change of the prime minister. The results
show that this change led to uncertainty, similary to the Gulen and Ion (2016) paper.
Following Chen et al. (2017), this study examines whether the market responses
are different for SOEs and private companies. Similar studies are rare. Another
important element of this study is the analysis of the capital market of Poland—a
post-communist economy that has recently been reclassified as a mature economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 presents an
economic overview. Section 3 provides a review of the relevant literature and formu-
lates the hypotheses. Section 4 describes and characterizes the dataset and method-
ology. Sections 5 and 6 provide research outcomes and discussions, respectively and
section 7 concludes.
2. Economic overview
To gain a better understanding of the nature of the analyzed event, it is necessary to
present a background on Poland’s political situation. The centrist, conservative-liberal
coalition government stepped down after two terms in office in 2015. The following
elections were won by a conservative group with an economic orientation toward
interventionism; the party could rule independently without a coalition partner as it
had a majority in the Parliament and a party member as the president of the country.
The change of the president led to discounting of assets by over 10% on the stock
exchange for more than 6months. The victory of Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and
Justice Party) in the parliamentary election2 was followed by another quarter with a
16% drop in the value of assets on the stock exchange; this was accompanied by a
decline of nearly 12% in the Polish Zloty’s value. Additionally, the proposed policy
style, economic reforms, and market reaction led Standard & Poor’s to downgrade
Poland’s rating to BBBþ.3 Few months after the election, all mentioned values were
back to the primary levels. This reaction corresponds to the evidence presented in the
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study by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018). Based on African markets, the authors
prove that democratic regimes, especially economic democracy, enjoy financial market
boom and autocratic regimes lead to market recession.
When Prime Minister Beata Szydło resigned, she was replaced by Mateusz
Morawiecki, the then Minister of Finance and former CEO of a large bank. He was
chosen for the position because he was perceived as being more pro-economy, and
had a good reputation among Poles and economic commentators. Theoretically, the
change should have triggered a positive reaction in the market (Blanchard, 1981;
Croce et al., 2012).
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
When analyzing the literature in the context of the relationship between politics and
the stock exchange, five basic research trends can be identified (Wisniewski, 2016).
The first is the valuation of the relationship of political connections. The second
focuses on the government’s political orientation. A third important research area
relates to political cycles, the impact of elections on capital markets, and the uncer-
tainty associated with a new government. The fourth area covers events such as wars,
international crises, terrorist attacks, and changes in leadership. The fifth focuses on
changes in fiscal and monetary policy.
As part of the first trend, there is a body of literature on the market’s reaction to
companies having former and current politicians on their management boards. Faccio
(2006) shows that companies with such connections generate higher rates of return.
In countries with a strong military presence, affiliated companies generate signifi-
cantly higher yields. For example, in Thailand, affiliated companies generated 160-
percentage-points higher returns than non-affiliated companies (Bunkanwanicha &
Wiwattanakantang, 2009), while in Indonesia, any deterioration in President
Suharto’s health resulted in statistically significant decreases in affiliated companies’
prices (Fisman, 2001). Another research stream considers the fact that having a polit-
ician on the board of directors often comes with government subsidies, as demon-
strated by Johnson and Mitton (2003) in their study on Malaysian companies. In
their examination of the companies from the US and Europe, Shleifer and Vishny
(1994) show that grants are given for meeting political objectives and vice versa—
companies often express their willingness to pay a certain sum for evading participa-
tion in political projects.
Examining the influence of parliamentary elections on capital markets, a stream of
research links election cycles to the activities of stock exchange entities and their
stocks (Bertrand et al., 2018; Goldman et al., 2012). Both papers demonstrate how
companies with political ties contribute toward increasing electoral opportunities of
their political parties. Apart from these studies, a second trend shows that companies
limit investments in pre-election periods (Julio and Yook, 2012, 2016). Several studies
also address the impact of the political cycle on the rates of return; they indicate an
overvaluation of assets during the first quarter of a new administration and a surge
in yields—as high as 24%—during the second quarter (Huang, 1985). Similar results
are presented by Wong and McAleer (2009) and Kr€aussl et al. (2014). G€artner and
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Wellershoff’s (1995) analysis of US companies during 1961–1992 shows the presence
of this pattern in the US since the 1960s. This reaction may be attributed to the time
needed by a new administration to introduce reforms and the uncertainty associated
with its implementation (Gulen & Ion, 2016; Luo et al., 2017). The change in the law
on corruption was also pointed out in the study by Dimic et al. (2015) as one of the
most important components of political risk. Chen et al. (2018) and Hillier and
Loncan (2019) also analyzed the corruption aspect. They showed that providing infor-
mation on the conversation between the president and a prominent businessman
resulted in a nearly 10% decline in the value of the main index on the San Paulo
stock exchange.
These stock market uncertainties also emerge from geopolitical events, like Brexit.
Few studies recently published have exploited this event. Tielmann and Schiereck
(2017) found an overall negative effect of the Brexit referendum on the value of
European logistics companies. Schiereck et al. (2016) established that the reaction of
banks’ stock prices to the Brexit announcement was more severe than the response to
Lehman’s bankruptcy, while the reaction of the credit default swap market was far
more subdued. Jackowicz et al. (2017) indicate the absence of a fundamental proof of
a reaction on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE).
Political change leads to a change in fiscal, and at times, monetary policies also
(Blanchard, 1981). Left-wing governments tend to strengthen the state’s influence on
the economy, which will increase taxation, budgetary expenditures, and debt, conse-
quently increasing the risk of investment and cost of capital (Croce et al., 2012).
Right-wing governments typically develop a more expansionary monetary policy by
lowering interest rates and increasing the money base (Darrat, 1988; Thorbecke,
1997). Moreover, elections also have an impact on tax and economic policies. Krol
(2014) proved that economic policy uncertainty increases the exchange rate volatility.
The election of US President Trump had a negative impact on US companies with
significant foreign exposure (Wagner et al., 2018). Jayachandran (2006) measured the
price response to the unexpected gain in control of the US Senate by the Democratic
Party. The total change in market capitalization of entities supporting the Republican
Party caused by the event was nearly US$1,000 billion. Based on these studies and
the reception of the public opinion of the new prime minister, the author proposes
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The change of the prime minister leads to a greater increase in prices on the
WSE than in the Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging Markets Index.
Moreover, the strength of the price impact of these events may depend on a firm’s
ownership structure. Chen et al. (2017) find that the relationship between the primary
market index and firm value is negative. Wang (2015) finds that the value effects of
political connections depend on the firm’s ownership. Chinese listed private firms
with a large fraction of politically connected independent directors outperform their
non-connected counterparts. In contrast, politically connected independent directors
fail to add value to SOEs. Based on these studies, the next hypothesis is proposed
as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The change of the prime minister leads to an increase in the prices of SOEs.
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It is also worth noting that political connections could also have various forms
(Jackowicz, 2013). Faccio (2006) and Johnson and Mitton (2003), among others, ana-
lyze the relationship by having a politically exposed person as a company officer.
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that political connections help companies to meet
political objectives and get benefits from the government. Chen et al. (2017) and
Wang (2015) also focus, according to Hypothesis 2, on shareholder ownership.
Carretta et al. (2012) show the possibility of direct and indirect political connections.
Therefore, the next two hypotheses verify the sample concerning the form of
state control:
Hypothesis 3: The change of the prime minister leads to an increase in the prices of
directly controlled SOEs.
Hypothesis 4: The change of the prime minister leads to an increase in the prices of
indirectly controlled SOEs.
4. Dataset and methodology
The analysis uses 376 companies listed on the main index of the WSE. The sample
was divided based on ownership, according to the methodology used by Chen et al.
(2017). In their research for Chinese market, they define an SOE as a company that
has a state government stake. In my sample, capital structures are more complicated
because there are two types of SOEs: those directly controlled by the State Treasury
and those controlled through different SOEs. For this study, direct SOEs are classified
as those in which the state government’s share is above 5%. The sample comprises 2
cases with government ownership exceeding 5% and 14 cases with ownership exceed-
ing 30%. A similar definition was adopted for indirect SOEs or companies with enti-
ties directly controlled by the government in the shareholding structure. In practice, a
share of up to 5% allows a minister to have a significant impact on the company’s
operations. Based on these definitions, this study considers 4 subsamples, with 376,
16, 26, and 12 firms in the first, second, third, and final subsamples, respectively
(Figure A1).
Hypothesis testing was conducted using the event study methodology and regres-
sion analysis. The first step of research included estimation of the CAR for each com-
pany using a market model, wherein the parameters were estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS). The return rates were expressed as natural logarithms. A 250-day
estimation window was taken as an approximation of the financial year, beginning
310 days before the event and ending 60 days before the event. This window elimi-
nated the possibility of the market anticipating the event. The event window covered
a 21-day period—10 days before the event to 10 days after the event (Figure A2).
In the second part of this research, a multivariate approach is used wherein the
CARs are regressed against a set of explanatory variables. The OLS regressions, with
robust standard errors, are estimated separately for each of the three forms of control.
Based on the OLS regression, the following is obtained:
CARt1, t2i ¼ f Firm, Fin Firm, Ownershipð Þ (1)
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where the dependent variable, CARt1, t2i , is the CAR for the firm calculated over
the< t1,t2> event window. The explanatory variables are grouped into three types.
The first type is denoted by Firm, which provides information about the characteris-
tics of a firm affected by the CAR. The variables within this type are Freefloat, TAT,
ROE, Ln Revenues, Property to assets, and P/BV. The second type has only one vari-
able, Fin firm, which controls the industrial specificity of a firm, as it takes the value
of 1 for financial firms and 0 otherwise. Comprising binary variables SOE, direct
SOE, or indirect SOE, the last type of variables describes a firm’s ownership structure:
the direct SOE variable identifies firms with at least 5% government share.
Table A1 summarizes the definitions of all dependent and explanatory variables in
the study, while Table A2 presents the descriptive statistics of different CARs in the
first part. The table further shows that the FIRM-type variables have similar values in
each subsample. The most critical differential parameter is the ownership type.
5. Results
Table A3 presents the results of the univariate analysis for the first research sub-
sample, which includes all companies listed on the WSE. The empirical return rates’
column presents the event window return rates and shows a small adjustment in pri-
ces on the event day. The analysis of individual event windows within the cumulated
abnormal returns rates (CAR) shows long-term corrections with statistical signifi-
cance only for the window <–10; 10> and <0; 10> (Table A3, Chart A1). Therefore,
hypothesis 1 is not supported.
The results presented in Table A4 show a negative reaction in the group of 26 dir-
ect and indirect SOEs. The abnormal return rate on day 0 is close to -1% and is stat-
istically significant at the 10% level. Additionally, permanent declines in the CARs are
visible—abnormal returns rate decrease each day after the event day to day number
10 by 0.325%. The CARs for windows <–3; 3>, <–2; 2>, and <0; 2> are also statis-
tically significant. The analysis in Chart A2 shows fluctuations in CARs. On the one
hand, this indicates market participants’ negative perception about the change of the
prime minister. However, subsequently, the alternating increase and decrease in the
share price show that the fluctuations are more a result of a behavioral rather than a
fundamental reaction.
The analysis of the 16-firm sample of direct SOEs showed a statistically significant
correction on the day of the event (Table A5, Chart A3). The CAR for the window
–10 to 10, which showed a price correction of more than 4%, is important. The CAR
for windows <–3; 3> and <0; 2> are also negative and statistically significant. The
CAR for windows after the event shows a price decrease in <0; 10> of over 3 per-
centage points. However, as previously noted, it declines by 1.13% on the event day.
This reaction indicates that the change of the prime minister triggered a negative
market reaction, and hence, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. The new head of the gov-
ernment was considered to be more pro-economy, which may have triggered behav-
ioral reactions, such as uncertainty or aversion to change. This can also be explained
by the expected risk of changes in companies’ management boards.
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A weaker reaction in the case of these companies makes it necessary to conduct
another analysis only for indirect SOEs. There is no significant market reaction after
the event day. As presented in Table A6, the CAR is negative for the window <–10;
10> only, at 2.19 percentage points and not statistically significant. For the window
<–5; 5>, the CAR has a p-value at the 10% level, and is equal to 2.3% for the <–2;
2> window. The biggest drops in CAR, by more than 1 percentage point, are noted
on days 0, 2, and 6. Chart A4 provides an additional illustration of systematic CAR
decline. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not confirmed, while the support for Hypothesis 3
may be attributed to the changes in the stock price of direct SOEs.
The next stage of the research is a multivariate analysis aimed at checking whether
the ownership factor led to abnormal rates of return. The analysis confirms the con-
clusions of the univariate analysis. Companies from the second subsample, that is,
SOEs (Table A7), reacted negatively to the change of the prime minister; the variable
representing this type of capital ties is characterized by statistically significant, nega-
tive coefficients. In the case of the models for the entire sample of 342 entities, the
coefficient of the SOE variable was characterized by statistical significance. After
excluding financial entities from the sample, that is, in the analysis of 277 entities,
the parameter for the SOE variable obtained a p-value of less than 10% in four out of
six models. The binary variable encoding enterprises directly controlled by the State
Treasury (Table A8) indicates a strong negative impact of the event in the three win-
dows <–1; 1>, <–2; 2>, and <0; 2>. The negative reaction is not limited to compa-
nies directly controlled by the State Treasury; the coefficients of the indirectly
controlled SOE variable (Table A9) are also negative and statistically significant.
Indirectly controlled SOEs are mainly characterized by negative coefficients of the
indirect SOE variable for windows starting from day –2.
The results of the multivariate regression model estimation presented in Table A7
consistently indicate a negative market reaction for SOEs. In the <–1; 1> window,
for the whole sample, coefficients obtained for ROE, natural logarithm from revenues,
and binary variables for the type of entity, not mentioning the constant, are all statis-
tically significant. The ROE variable, with a p-value below 10%, is present in the
other three models; this variable is always accompanied by a negative value of the
parameter. Other variables with statistical significance have low coefficients in terms
of absolute value. It is also worth referring to the model for the window <0; 1> for
all companies. In this case, all the variables are statistically significant. Wald’s tests
indicate the statistical significance of models for windows <–1; 1>, <0; 1>, and
<–2; 2>.
The multivariate models presented in Table A8 illustrate a consistently negative
market reaction for companies controlled directly by the State Treasury. However, in
the case of the binary variable, direct SOEs, a negative, statistically significant reaction
occurs for windows covering two days after the event. This finding confirms the
results obtained from the univariate analysis, that is, the change of the prime minister
had a negative impact on these companies on the day of the event, which was sus-
tained even after the event. It is difficult to see a different pattern in the particular
models other than the impact of control over the company on CAR. The ratio for the
ROE variable is negative and statistically significant only in the windows <–1; 1>
1568 B. PODGORSKI
and <–2; 0>. The coefficient of the binary variable denoting financial entities is stat-
istically significant only in the <–1; 1> window. The coefficient of the variable calcu-
lated as a natural logarithm of income is statistically significant and has a value close
to zero. Wald’s tests indicate the statistical significance of models for windows <–1;
1>, <0; 1>, and <–2; 2>.
The third set of multivariate models analyzing the sample in terms of the variable
denoting companies indirectly controlled by the State Treasury (Table A9) also show
a negative market reaction. However, in the case of the coefficient of the binary vari-
able, indirect SOEs, the negative and statistically significant reaction is seen mainly
for windows covering day –2. The result for the window <–2; 2> confirms the
results obtained from the univariate analysis; it reminds that only this window was
characterized by statistically significant CARs. Similarly, for models with a binary
variable encoding companies controlled directly by the State Treasury, the ROE vari-
able is negative and statistically significant only in windows <–1; 1> and <–2; 0>;
the binary variable encoding financial entities is statistically significant only in win-
dow <–1; 1>. Therefore, it can be concluded that the negative reaction is not limited
to companies directly controlled by the State Treasury. However, improved levels of
static relevance of CARs and the reaction in the <0; 2> window indicate that in the
long-run, the market discounted the change in the case of companies directly con-
trolled by the State Treasury. Wald’s tests indicate the statistical significance of the
models for the window <–1; 1>.
6. Discussion
Even a small political change causes risk and impacts the capital markets (Kirikkaleli,
2020). The stock market reaction depends on views involving the office, the shock
causing irrational behavior of investors, and herd behavior. However, often investors
act rationally, differentiating their behavior towards types of entities and their expos-
ure to new situations, as demonstrated by this study. Only companies that were dir-
ectly exposed to political risk registered a significant reaction.
The direction of this reaction is aligned with the findings of Asongu and
Nwachukwu (2018), who prove that democratic regimes, especially economic democ-
racy, enjoy financial market boom and autocratic regimes lead to the market reces-
sion. Mensi et al. (2016), also show that market reaction is adverse. This study
supports this statement—stock prices of all the SOEs dropped on the event day.
These adverse reactions can be explained by the fact that the SOEs usually try to
meet the government objectives. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that this can result
in getting benefits from the government. In this study, it was demonstrated that SOE
serve government objectives, such as banks renationalization and steering of the
energy prices. However, this goal of SOE activities should be confirmed in future
research based on wider sample.
Moreover, the value effects of political connections depend on the firm’s owner-
ship (Wang, 2015). For this reason, the sample was divided into four subsamples
based on the work of Carretta et al. (2012). The market response was most visible in
the case of direct SOE. However, the market response was not limited to these
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entities only. The multivariate models prove that the indirect SOE factor strongly
affects the analyzed entities negatively.
7. Conclusions
In terms of verifying the impact of the change of the prime minister on companies,
the results presented indicate a reaction consistent with the hypothesis of information
efficiency; significant price changes were found only for SOEs, based on the univari-
ate and multivariate models. The CAR analysis shows that the reaction is stronger in
the case of direct SOEs. This finding is also confirmed in the regression models. The
negative reaction is not limited to companies directly controlled by the State
Treasury; the coefficients of the indirectly controlled SOE variable are also negative
and statistically significant. Despite the fact the hypotheses suggested an expected
price increase due to the new prime minister’s profile, the market response was nega-
tive, unlike the increase in stock prices after Donald Trump’s election (Shaikh, 2017;
Wagner et al., 2018). This can be attributed to the uncertainty regarding the new
administration’s reforms (Gulen & Ion, 2016; Luo et al., 2017). However, the results
can also be explained based on risk aversion connected with the expected risk of
changes in companies’ management boards. Such changes could lead to a change in
companies’ management style. The continuation of the downward trend after the
event depicts the negative change in the CAR analysis chart.
The major limitation of this research is single country evidence. Following Dimic
et al. (2015), who show that market reactions to political risk is higher in advanced
emerging and emerging economies. Further research should compare unexpected
changes in a bigger sample of countries and different types of economies. Based on
Rozeff and Kinney (1976) research, I should also separate month anomaly, but the
study by Podgorski (2018) proves that this anomaly does not exist on the WSE.
Faccio (2004, 2006) and Jackowicz (2013) also provide evidence on the impact of per-
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Chart A3. Cumulated abnormal return rate subsample III. Source: Own Calculations based on the
data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
Chart A1. Cumulated abnormal return rate subsample I. Source: Own Calculations based on the
data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
Chart A2. Cumulated abnormal return rate subsample II. Source: Own Calculations based on the
data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
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Chart A4. Cumulated abnormal return rate subsample IV. Source: Own Calculations based on the
data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
Figure A1. Construction of the sample and subsamples. Source: Own work.
Figure A2. Estimation and event window timeline. Source: Own work.
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Table A1. Variable definitions.
Panel A. Event characteristics
CAR[–1,1], CAR[–1,0], CAR[0,1],
CAR[–2,2], CAR[–2,0], CAR[0,2]
Cumulative abnormal return in the [–1,1], [–1,0], [0,1], [–2,2],
[–2,0], or [0,2] event window, respectively
Panel B. Firm characteristics
Fin firm Binary variable taking a value of 1 for financial
firms and 0 otherwise
Freefloata Free float
TATa Total assets turnover
ROEa Return on equity
Ln Revenuesa Natural logarithm of a revenues
Property to assetsa Property, plant, and equipment to total assets
P/BVa Price to book value
SOE Binary variable taking a value of 1 for firms with
at least 5% government share in the ownership
structure, and 0 otherwise
Direct SOE Binary variable taking a value of 1 for firms with at least
5% direct government share in the ownership
structure, and 0 otherwise
Indirect SOE Binary variable taking a value of 1 for firms with
at least 5% indirect government share in the
ownership structure and 0 otherwise
aAt the beginning of the year preceding the event year.
Source: Own Calculations based on the data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3. Cumulated abnormal returns for subsample one: All listed companies of the WSE.
Window CAR Window CAR
<–10;10> –1.9061% <0> –0.1626%
<–5;5> –0.3927% <0;1> –0.1199%
<–2;2> 0.0740% <0;2> –0.0839%
<–1;1> 0.0374% <0;3> –0.2251%
<–5; –1> –0.0247% <0;5> –0.3680%
<–2; –1> 0.1579% <0;10> –1.8803%
This table presents the results of CARs for different event windows. The left part of the table presents windows con-
sisting of the event day and CAR before the event day. The right part of table presents AR change after the event.
Note: , , and  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Own Calculations based on the data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
Table A4. Cumulated abnormal returns for subsample two: State Owned Enterprises listed on
the WSE.
Window CAR Window CAR
<–10;10> –4.2750% <0> –1.5232%
<–5;5> –0.1207% <0; 1> –0.6609%
<–2;2> –1.5444% <0; 2> –1.6146%
<–1;1> –0.8977% <0; 3> –2.7201%
<–5; –1> 1.2521% <0; 5> –1.3728%
<–2; –1> 0.0702% <0; 10> –3.2521%
This table presents the results of CARs for different event windows. The left part of the table presents windows con-
sisting of the event day and CAR before the event day. The right part of table presents AR change after the event.
Source: Own Calculations based on the data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
Table A5. Cumulated abnormal returns for subsample three: Direct SOEs listed on the WSE.
Window CAR Window CAR
<–10; 10> –3.8761% <0> –1.1329%
<–5; 5> –1.3780% <0; 1> –0.4623%
<–2; 2> –1.7740% <0; 2> –1.4990%
<–1; 1> –0.7822% <0; 3> –2.1349%
<–5; –1> 0.4273% <0; 5> –1.8052%
<–2; –1> –0.2750% <0; 10> –3.0597%
This table presents the results of CARs for different event windows. The left part of the table presents windows con-
sisting of the event day and CAR before the event day. The right part of table presents AR change after the event.
Source: Own Calculations based on the data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
Table A6. Cumulated abnormal returns for subsample four: Indirect SOEs listed on the WSE.
Window CAR Window CAR
<–10; 10> –2.1995% <0> –0.3830%
<–5; 5> –2.6490% <0; 1> –0.0699%
<–2; 2> –1.9378% <0; 2> –1.0967%
<–1; 1> –0.1863% <0; 3> –1.0021%
<–5; –1> –0.9150% <0; 5> –1.7340%
<–2; –1> –0.8411% <0; 10> –1.8862%
This table presents the results of CARs for different event windows. The left part of the table presents windows con-
sisting of the event day and CAR before the event day. The right part of table presents AR change after the event.
Source: Own Calculations based on the data form the Thomson Reuters Eikon.
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